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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/07/2011

Accident number: 754

Accident time: 10:00

Accident Date: 07/05/2009

Where it occurred: AF/13/1301/12978,
MF-5284, Wali Khail
village, Baghlan
District, Baghlan
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)
Class: Excavation accident

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 28/05/2009

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 15/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
use of pick (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
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Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 28th May 2009
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] MDG-17 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kunduz to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] MDG-17. The accident occurred at
10:00 hours on 07 May 2009 at minefield number AF/13/1301/12978/MF-5284, located in
Wali Khail village, Baghlan district of Baghlan province.
SUMMARY:
Minefield # AF/13/1301/12978/MF-5284 is located in an area which was front line between
different belligerent groups (northern Alliance and Sayed Kayan forces) during the year 1999
to 2001. From the military point of view this area was important to the involved parties of the
war, therefore, was exchanged between them for several times and each time they laid AP
mines there to stop the attacks of opposition. So far 7 accidents happened there on human
including 3 were fatal accidents.
On 01st of April 2009 the [Demining group] MDG-17 was tasked to start clearance operation
in mentioned area. The area was divided to 2 tasks by polygon survey team of [Other
demining group]. The size of task under [Demining group] operations is about 61000 sqm.
Around 37700 sqm of the total size was cleared by MDG-17 till the accident time, they
found/destroyed 34 AP mines.
On 07th of May at 10:00 hours the de-miner [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane
excavating a detected signal by unsuitable excavation tool (Pick). He hit the top of mine with a
pick and caused it to go off. According to the investigation report the signal was not
pinpointed correctly and the de-miner has used his pick carelessly. As a result he sustained
multiple superficial injuries on his eyes, chest, Face, and both hands, the injured parts of the
deminer body and his PPE clearly indicate that he had not used his PPE during operation.
Because there is no any damage on his PPE to show that it was used properly.
CONCLUSIONS:
However the investigation report concluded that the deminer was careless during operation
and poor supervision has also had its role in this accident. But this is not the first case of
using picks by [Demining group] teams. There are Non-conformity reports on [Demining
group] teams for using picks during investigation of signals. And also there is another
accident of the same nature in 2008. The NCRs and lessons learned reports were shared
with [Demining group] but no action is taken so far.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
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•

Standard and appropriate tools of prodding and excavation should be used during
operations.

•

The de-miner should pinpoint the signal properly, mark and then start excavation
according to the set procedure.

•

Full PPE must be worn correctly during operations on a hazard area. There is no
exception to the involved personnel.

•

The command group should strengthen their supervision during operation and stop
the de-miners from conducting drills in contrary to SOPs.

•

[Demining group] operations department is to take this issue serious and come up
with practical solution to it.

Victim Report
Victim number: 944

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Chest; minor Eyes; minor Face; minor Hands
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . multiple superficial injuries on his
eyes, chest, Face, and both hands".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate equipment because the
investigators found that the Pick-axe was inappropriate and was being used in defiance of
earlier instructions. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy
because the group’s management has the responsibility for the issue of appropriate tools and
training. The Victim’s failure to pinpoint the Ceia detector reading appropriately implies a
failure of training or equipment (or both).
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.
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